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Abstract
Several recent papers have introduced a periodic verification mechanism
to detect silent errors in iterative solvers. Chen [PPoPP’13, pp. 167–176]
has shown how to combine such a verification mechanism (a stability test
checking the orthogonality of two vectors and recomputing the residual) with
checkpointing: the idea is to verify every d iterations, and to checkpoint
every c × d iterations. When a silent error is detected by the verification
mechanism, one can rollback to, and re-execute from, the last checkpoint. In
this paper, we also propose to combine checkpointing and verification, but we
use ABFT rather than stability tests. ABFT can be used for error detection,
but also for error detection and correction, allowing a forward recovery (and
no rollback nor re-execution) when a single error is detected. We introduce an
abstract performance model to compute the performance of all schemes, and
we instantiate it using the Conjugate Gradient algorithm. Finally, we validate
our new approach through a set of simulations.
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1. Introduction
Silent errors (or silent data corruption) have become a
significant concern in HPC environments [28]. There are many
sources of silent errors, from bit flips in cache caused by
cosmic radiations, to wrong results produced by the arithmetic
and logic unit. The latter source becomes extremely important,
because large computations are usually performed in low
voltage mode, to reduce energy consumption, a condition
known to dramatically reduce the dependability of the system.
The key problem with silent errors is the detection latency:
when a silent error strikes, the corrupted data is not identified
immediately, but instead only when some anomaly is detected
in the application behavior. This detection can occur with
an arbitrary delay. As a consequence, the de-facto standard
method for resilience, namely checkpoint and recovery, cannot
be used any longer. Indeed, checkpoint and recovery applies
to fail-stop errors (such as hardware crashes): such errors are
detected immediately, and one can safely recover from the last
checkpoint. On the contrary, because of the detection latency
induced by silent errors, it is impossible to know when the
error did strike, and hence to determine which checkpoint (if
any) is valid and can be safely used to restore the application
state. Even for the unrealistic scenario where an unlimited
number of checkpoints could be kept in memory, there would
remain the problem to identify a valid one!
In the absence of a resilience method, the only known
remedy to silent errors is to re-execute the application from
scratch as soon as a silent error are detected. On large-scale
systems, the silent error rate grows linearly with the number
of components, and several silent errors are expected to strike
during the execution of a typical HPC application. The cost
of re-executing the application one or more times becomes
prohibitive, and another approach must be taken.
Several recent papers have proposed to introduce a verifi-
cation mechanism that could be applied periodically to detect
silent errors. These papers mostly target iterative methods to
solve sparse linear systems, because such methods are natural
candidates to periodic detection. If we apply the verification
mechanism every, say, d iterations, then we have the opportu-
nity to detect the error earlier, namely at most d− 1 iterations
after the actual faulty iteration, thereby stopping the progress
of a flawed execution much earlier than without detection.
However, the cost of the verification may be non-negligible in
front of the cost of one application iteration, hence the need to
trade-off for an adequate value of d. Verification can consist in
testing the orthogonality of two vectors (cheap) or recomputing
the residual (cost of a sparse matrix-vector product, more
expensive). We survey several verification mechanisms in
Section 2. An important caveat is that each approach applies
only to a given type of silent errors: in other words, a selective
reliability model is enforced, and those parts of the application
that are not protected are assumed to execute in reliable mode.
While verification mechanisms speed up the detection of
silent errors, they are not able to provide correction, hence
cannot avoid a full re-execution of the application. A solution
is to combine checkpointing with verification. If we apply the
verification mechanism every d iterations, we can checkpoint
every c × d iterations, thereby limiting the amount of re-
execution considerably. The last checkpoint is always valid,
because it is preceded by a verification, and the error, if any, is
always detected by one of the c verifications applied before the
next checkpoint is taken. This is exactly the approach proposed
by Chen [9] for a variety of Krylov-based methods, including
the widely used Conjugate Gradient (CG) algorithm. Chen [9]
gives an equation for the overhead incurred by checkpointing
and verification, and determines the best values of c and d
by a numerical resolution of the equation. In fact, computing
the optimal values of c and d is a difficult problem. In the
case of pure periodic checkpointing, closed-form approxima-
tions of the optimal period have been given by Young [35]
and Daly [10]. However, when combining checkpointing and
verification, the problem becomes much more difficult. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no known closed-form formula,
but a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the optimal
repartition of checkpoints and verifications is available [3].
For linear algebra kernels, another widely used technique
for silent error detection is algorithm-based fault tolerance
(ABFT). The pioneering paper of Huang and Abraham [22]
describes an algorithm capable of detecting and correcting a
single silent error striking a dense matrix-matrix multiplication
by means of row and column checksums. ABFT protection has
been successfully applied to dense LU and QR factorizations,
and more recently to sparse kernels, SpMxV (matrix-vector
product) and triangular solve [31]. The overhead induced by
ABFT is usually small, which makes it a good candidate for
error detection at each iteration of the CG algorithm.
The beauty of ABFT is that it can correct errors in addition
to detecting them. This comes at the price of more overhead,
because several checksums are needed to detect and correct,
while a single checksum was needed for sole detection. Still,
being able to correct a silent error on the fly allows for forward
recovery. No rollback, recovery nor re-execution are needed
when a single silent error is detected at some iteration, because
ABFT can correct it, and execution is safely resumed from
that very same iteration. Only when two or more silent errors
have struck within an iteration we do need to rollback to the
last checkpoint. In many practical situations, only single errors
will occur within an iteration, and most of the roll-back will
be avoided. In turn, this will lead to less frequent checkpoints,
and hence less overhead.
The major contribution of this paper is to build a perfor-
mance model that allows to compare methods that combine
verification and checkpointing. The verification mechanism
is capable of error detection, or of both error detection and
correction. What are the optimal intervals for verifying and
checkpointing, given the cost of an iteration, the overhead
associated to each verification mechanism, the overhead as-
sociated to checkpoint and recovery, and the rate of silent
errors? Our abstract model provides the optimal answer to
this question, as a function of the cost of all application and
resilience parameters.
We instantiate the model using the CG kernel, and compare
the performance of two ABFT-based verification mechanisms
The first ABFT-based scheme is called ABFT-DETECTION
and is capable of error detection only, while the second
scheme, ABFT-CORRECTION, performs both detection and
single error correction. Through numerical simulations, we
compare the performance of both schemes with ONLINE-
DETECTION, the approach of Chen [9] (which we extend to re-
cover from memory errors by checkpointing the sparse matrix
in addition to the current iteration vectors). These simulations
show that ABFT-CORRECTION outperforms both ONLINE-
DETECTION and ABFT-DETECTION for a wide range of fault
rates, thereby demonstrating that combining checkpointing
with ABFT correcting techniques is more efficient than pure
checkpointing for most practical situations.
All our discussion focuses on sequential execution of it-
erative methods. Yet, all our techniques extend to parallel
implementation based on the message passing paradigm (with
using, e.g., MPI). In an implementation of SpMxV in such a
setting, the processing elements (or processors) hold a part of
the matrix and the input vector, and hold a part of the output
vector at the end. Typically (a recent exposition of different
algorithms can be found elsewhere [24]), the processors per-
form scalar multiply operations on the local matrix elements
and the input vector elements, when all of the required vector
elements are received form others. The implementations of
the MPI standard guarantees correct message delivery, i.e.,
checksums are incorporated into the message so as to prevent
transmission errors (the receives can be done in-place and
hence are protected). However, the receiver will obviously
get corrupted data if the sender sends corrupted data. Silent
error can indeed strike at a given processor during local scalar
multiply operations. Performing error detection and correction
locally imply global error detection and correction for the
SpMxV. Note that, in this case, the local matrix elements can
form a matrix which cannot be assumed to be square in general
(for some iterative solvers they can be). Furthermore, the
MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) reduces linearly with
the number of processors. This is well-known for memoryless
distributions of fault inter-arrival times and remains true for
arbitrary continuous distributions of finite mean [2].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of related work. Section 3 provides
background on ABFT techniques for the CG algorithm, and
presents both the ABFT-DETECTION and ABFT-CORREC-
TION approaches. Section 4 is devoted to the abstract per-
formance model. Section 5 reports numerical simulations
comparing the performance of ABFT-DETECTION, ABFT-
CORRECTION and ONLINE-DETECTION. Finally, we outline
main conclusions and directions for future work in Section 6.
2. Related work
We classify related work along the following topics: silent
errors in general, verification mechanisms for iterative meth-
ods, and ABFT techniques.
Silent errors. Considerable efforts have been directed at error-
checking to reveal silent errors. Error detection is usually
very costly. Hardware mechanisms, such as ECC memory,
can detect and even correct a fraction of errors, but in practice
they are complemented with software techniques. The simplest
technique is triple modular redundancy and voting [26], which
induces a highly costly verification. For high-performance
scientific applications, process replication (each process is
equipped with a replica, and messages are quadruplicated)
is proposed in the RedMPI library [16]. Elliot et al. [14]
combine partial redundancy and checkpointing, and confirm
the benefit of dual and triple redundancy. The drawback is
that twice the number of processing resources is required (for
dual redundancy). A comprehensive list of general-purpose
techniques and references is provided by Lu et al. [25].
Application-specific information can be very useful to en-
able ad-hoc solutions, which dramatically decrease the cost of
detection. Many techniques have been advocated. They include
memory scrubbing [23] and ABFT techniques (see below).
As already pointed out, most papers focus on a selective
reliability setting [7], [20], [21], [30]. It essentially means
that one can choose to perform any operation in reliable
or unreliable mode, assuming the former to be error-free
but energy consuming and the latter to be error-prone but
preferable from an energetic point of view.
Iterative methods. Iterative methods offer a wide range of
ad-hoc approaches. For instance, instead of duplicating the
computation, Benson et al. suggest coupling a higher-order
with a lower-order scheme for PDEs [4]. Their method only
detects an error but does not correct it. Self-stabilizing correc-
tions after error detection in the CG method are investigated
by Sao and Vuduc [30]. Heroux and Hoemmen [17] design
a fault-tolerant GMRES capable of converging despite silent
errors. Bronevetsky and de Supinski [8] provide a comparative
study of detection costs for iterative methods.
As already mentioned, a nice instantiation of the checkpoint
and verification mechanism that we study in this paper is
provided by Chen [9], who deals with sparse iterative solvers.
For CG, the verification amounts to checking the orthogonality
of two vectors and to recomputing and checking the residual
(see Section 3.1 for further details).
As already mentioned, our abstract performance model is
agnostic of the underlying error-detection technique and takes
the cost of verification as an input parameter to the model.
ABFT. The very first idea of algorithm-based fault tolerance
for linear algebra kernels is given by Huang and Abraham [22].
They describe an algorithm capable of detecting and correcting
a single silent error striking a matrix-matrix multiplication
by means of row and column checksums. This germinal idea
is then elaborated by Anfinson and Luk [1], who propose a
method to detect and correct up to two errors in a matrix
representation using just four column checksums. Despite its
theoretical merit, the idea presented in their paper is actually
applicable only to relatively small matrices, and is hence out
of our scope.
The problem of algorithm-based fault-tolerance for sparse
matrices is investigated by Shantharam et al. [31], who suggest
a way to detect a single error in an SpMxV at the cost of a
few additional dot products. Sloan et al. [32] suggest that this
approach can be relaxed using randomization schemes, and
propose several checksumming techniques for sparse matrices.
These techniques are less effective than the previous ones, not
being able to protect the computation from faults striking the
memory, but provide an interesting theoretical insight. Surveys
of ABFT schemes are provided in [5], [12].
3. CG-ABFT
We streamline our discussion on the CG method, however,
the techniques that we describe are applicable to any iterative
solver that use sparse matrix vector multiplies and vector
operations. This list includes many of the non-stationary
iterative solvers such as CGNE, BiCG, BiCGstab where sparse
matrix transpose vector multiply operations also take place.
Furthermore, preconditioned variants of these solvers with an
approximate inverse preconditioner (applied as SpMxV) can
also be made fault-tolerant with the proposed scheme.
In Section 3.1, we first provide a background on the CG
method and overview both Chen’s stability tests [9] and ABFT
protection schemes. Then we detail ABFT techniques for the
SpMxV kernel.
Algorithm 1 The Conjugate Gradient algorithm for a sparse
positive definite matrix.
Input: A ∈ Rn×n,b,x0 ∈ Rn, ε ∈ R
Output: x ∈ Rn : ‖Ax− b‖ ≤ ε
1: r0 ← b−Ax0;
2: p0 ← r0;
3: i← 0;
4: while ‖ri‖ > ε (‖A‖ · ‖r0‖+ ‖b‖) do
5: q← Api;
6: αi ← ‖ri‖2 /pᵀi q;
7: xi+1 ← xi + αpi;
8: ri+1 ← ri − αq;
9: β ← ‖ri+1‖2 / ‖ri‖2;
10: pi+1 ← ri+1 + β pi;
11: i← i+ 1;
12: end while
13: return xi;
3.1. CG and verification mechanisms
The code for the CG method is shown in Algorithm 1. As
seen in Algorithm 1, the main loop CG has a sparse matrix-
vector multiply, two inner products (for pᵀi q and ‖ri+1‖2),
and three vector operations of the form axpy.
Chen’s stability tests [9] amount to checking the orthog-
onality of vectors pi+1 and q, at the price of computing
pᵀi+1q
‖pi+1‖‖qi‖ , and to checking the residual at the price of an
additional SpMxV operation Axi − b. The dominant cost of
these verifications is the additional SpMxV operation.
The only modification made to Chen’s original approach is
that we also save the sparse matrix A in addition to the current
iteration vectors. This is needed when a silent error is detected:
if this error comes for a corruption in data memory, we need to
recover with a valid copy of the data matrix A. This holds for
the three methods under study, ONLINE-DETECTION, ABFT-
DETECTION and ABFT-CORRECTION, which have exactly
the same checkpoint cost.
We now introduce our own protection and verification
mechanisms. We use ABFT techniques to protect the SpMxV,
its computations (hence the vector q), the matrix A and the
input vector pi. As ABFT methods for vector operations is
as costly as a repeated computation, we use triple modular
redundancy (TMR) for them for simplicity. That is we do not
protect pi, q, ri, and xi of the ith loop beyond the SpMxV at
line 5 with ABFT, but we compute the dots, norms and axpy
operations in the resilient mode.
Although theoretically possible, constructing ABFT mech-
anism to detect up to k errors is practically not feasible for
k > 2. The same mechanism can be used to correct up to
bk/2c. Therefore, we focus on detecting up to two errors and
correcting the error if there was only one. That is, we detect
up to two errors in the computation q ← Api (two entries
in q are faulty), or in pi, or in the sparse representation of
the matrix A. With TMR, we assume that the errors in the
computation are not overly frequent so that two out of three
are correct (we assume errors do not strike the vector data
here). Our fault-tolerant CG version thus have the following
ingredients: ABFT to detect up to two errors in the SpMxV
and correct the error, if there was only one; TMR for vector
operations; and checkpoint and roll-back in case errors are
not corrected. In the rest of this section, we discuss the
proposed ABFT method for the SpMxV (combining ABFT
with checkpointing is later in Section 4.2).
3.2. ABFT-SpMxV
The overhead of the standard single error correcting ABFT
technique is too high for the sparse matrix-vector product
case. Shantaram et al. [31] propose a cheaper ABFT SpMxV
algorithm that guarantees the detection of a single error
striking either the computation or the memory representation
of the two input operands (matrix and vector). As their results
depend on the sparse storage format adopted, throughout the
paper we will assume that sparse matrices are stored in the
compressed storage format by rows (CSR), that is by means of
three distinct arrays, namely Colid ∈ Nnnz(A), Val ∈ Rnnz(A)
and Rowidx ∈ Nn+1 [29, Sec. 3.4].
Shantaram et al. can protect y ← Ax, where A ∈ Rn×n
and x,y ∈ Rn. To perform error detection, they rely on a
column checksum vector c defined by
cj =
n∑
i=0
ai,j (1)
and an auxiliary copy x′ of the x vector. After having
performed the actual SpMxV, to validate the result it suffices to
compute
∑n
i=1 yi, c
ᵀx and cᵀx′, and to compare their values.
It can be shown [31] that in the case of no errors, these three
quantities carry the same value, whereas if a single error strikes
either the memory or the computation, one of them must differ
from the other two. Nevertheless, this method requires A to be
strictly diagonally dominant, that seems to restrict too much
the practical applicability of their method. Shantaram et al.
need this condition to ensure the detection of errors striking
an entry of x corresponding to a zero checksum column of
A. We further analyze that case and show how to overcome
the issue without imposing any restriction on A.
A nice way to characterize the problem is expressing it in
geometrical terms. Let us consider the computation of a single
entry of the checksum as
(wᵀA)j =
n∑
i=1
wiai,j = w
ᵀAj ,
where w ∈ Rn denotes the weight vector and Aj the j-th
column of A. Let us now interpret such an operation as the
result of the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 : Rn ×Rn → R defined by
〈u,v〉 7→ uᵀv. It is clear that a checksum entry is zero if and
only if the corresponding column of the matrix is orthogonal
to the weight vector. In (1), we have chosen w to be such
that wi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, in order to make the computation
easier. Let us see now what happens without this restriction.
The problem reduces to finding a vector w ∈ Rn that is
not orthogonal to any vector out of a basis B = {b1, . . . ,bn}
of Rn – the rows of the input matrix. Each one of these n
vectors is perpendicular to a hyperplane hi of Rn, and u does
not verify the condition
〈w,bi〉 6= 0, (2)
for any i, if and only if it lies on hi. As the Lebesgue
measure in Rn of an hyperplane of Rn itself is zero, the union
of these hyperplanes is measurable with mn (
⋃n
i=1 hi) = 0,
where mn denotes the Lebesgue measure of Rn. Therefore,
the probability that a vector w randomly picked in Rn does
not satisfy condition (2) for any i is zero.
Nevertheless, there are many reasons to consider zero
checksum columns. First of all, when working with finite
precision, the number of elements in Rn one can have is
finite, and the probability of randomly picking a vector that is
orthogonal to a given one could be bigger than zero. Moreover,
a coefficient matrix usually comes from the discretization of a
physical problem, and the distribution of its columns cannot be
considered as random. Finally, using a randomly chosen vector
instead of (1, . . . , 1)ᵀ increases the number of required floating
point operations, causing a growth of both the execution time
and the number of rounding errors (see Section 5). Therefore,
we would like to keep w = (1, . . . , 1)ᵀ as the vector of choice,
in which case we need to protect SpMxV with matrices having
zero column sums (in the context of some other iterative
methods than CG). There are many matrices with this property,
for example the Laplacian matrices of graphs [34].
In Algorithm 2, we propose an ABFT SpMxV method that
uses weighted checksums and does not require the matrix
to be strictly diagonally dominant. The idea is to compute
the checksum vector and then shift it by adding to all of its
entries a constant value chosen so that all of the elements
of the new vector are different from zero. We give the
result in Theorem 1 for the simpler case of single error
detection without correction, in which case Algorithm 2 has
W = (1, . . . , 1)ᵀ at line 1 and raises an error at line 26
if the tests at line 23 are not passed. The cases of multiple
error detection and single error correction are proved in the
accompanying technical report [15, Section 3.2].
Theorem 1 (Correctness of Algorithm 2 for single error
detection). Let A ∈ Rn×n be a square matrix, let x,y ∈ Rn
Algorithm 2 ABFT-protected SpMxV, detection of 2 errors,
correction of 1 error
Input: A ∈ Rn×n(asVal ∈ Rnnz(A),Colid ∈ Nnnz(A),Rowidx ∈
Rn), x ∈ Rn
Output: y = Ax, correction of single error or detection of double error
1: global Wᵀ ← [11 12 ...... 1n] ∈ R2×n;
2: global Wᵀ ← [Wᵀ 1n+1] ∈ R2×n+1;
3: x′ ← x;
4: [C,M, cr, cx] = COMPUTECHECKSUMS(Val , Colid , Rowidx );
5: return SPMXV(Val , Colid , Rowidx , x, x′, M, cr , cx);
6: function COMPUTECHECKSUMS(Val , Colid , Rowidx )
7: Cᵀ ←WᵀA;
8: M←W −C;
9: cr ←WᵀRowidx ;
10: cx ←Wᵀx;
11: return C,M, cr, cx;
12: function SPMXV(Val , Colid , Rowidx , x, x′, C, M, cr , cx)
13: sr ← 0 ∈ R2×1;
14: for i← 1 to n do
15: yi ← 0;
16: sr ← sr +
[w1,i
w2,i
]
Rowidx i;
17: for j ← Rowidx i to Rowidx i+1 − 1 do
18: ind← Colidj ;
19: yi ← yi +Valj · xind;
20: dr = cr − sr ;
21: dx =Wᵀy −Cᵀx;
22: dx′ =Wᵀ (x′ − y)−Mᵀx;
23: if dr = 0 ∧ dx = 0 ∧ dx′ = 0 then
24: return y;
25: else
26: CORRECTERRORS(Val , Colid , Rowidx , x, x′, C, M, dr , dx,
dx′ , cr , cx);
be the input and output vector respectively, and let x′ = x.
Let us assume that the algorithm performs the computation
y˜← A˜x˜, (3)
where A˜ ∈ Rn×n and x˜ ∈ Rn are the possibly faulty
representations of A and x respectively, while y˜ ∈ Rn is the
possibly erroneous result of the sparse matrix-vector product.
Let us also assume that the encoding scheme relies on
1) an auxiliary checksum vector c =
[
∑n
i=1 ai,1 + k, . . . ,
∑n
i=1 ai,n + k], where k is such
that
∑n
i=1 ai,j + k 6= 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
2) an auxiliary checksum yn+1 = k
∑n
i=i x˜i,
3) an auxiliary counter sr initialized to 0 and updated at
runtime by adding the value of the hit element each time
the Rowidx array is accessed,
4) an auxiliary checksum cr =
∑n
i=1Rowidx i ∈ N.
Then, a single error in the computation of the SpMxV causes
one of the following conditions to fail:
i. cᵀx˜ =
∑n+1
i=1 y˜i, difference is in dx at line 21,
ii. cᵀx′ =
∑n+1
i=1 y˜i, difference is in dx′ at line 22;
iii. sr = cr, difference is in dr at line 20.
The proof of this theorem is technical and is available in
the extended version of this paper [15, Theorem 1].
The function COMPUTECHECKSUM in Algorithm 2 requires
just the knowledge of the matrix. Hence in the common
scenario of many SpMxVs with the same matrix, it is enough
to invoke it once to protect several matrix-vector multiplica-
tions. This observation will be crucial when talking about the
performances of the checksumming techniques.
The longer version of this paper [15, Section 3.2] discusses
extensions to k ≥ 2 errors, where the following are detailed.
The method just described can be extended to detect up to a
total of k errors anywhere in the computation, in the repre-
sentation of A, or in the vector x. Building up the necessary
structures requires O (k nnz(A)) time, and the overhead per
SpMxV is O(kn). The particular case of k = 2 is also
detailed [15, Section 3.2], where a result similar to that in
Theorem 1 is shown.
We now discuss error correction. If at least one of the
tests at line 23 of Algorithm 2 fails, the algorithm invokes
CORRECTERRORS in order to determine whether just one
error struck either the computation or the memory and, in case,
correct it. Whenever a single error is detected, disregarding
its location (i.e., computation or memory) it is corrected by
means of a succession of various steps. Once the presence of
errors is detected, the correction mechanism tries to determine
the number of striking errors and, in case of single error, its
position. At this point the errors are corrected using the values
of the checksums and if need be partial recomputations of the
result are performed.
Specifically, we proceed as follows. To detect errors striking
Rowidx , we compute the the ratio d of the second component
of dr to the first one, and check whether its distance from
an integer is smaller than a certain threshold parameter ε.
If it is so, the algorithm concludes that the d-th element of
Rowidx is faulty, performs the correction by subtracting the
first component of dr to Rowidxd, and recomputes yd and
yd−1, if the error in Rowindexd is a decrement; or yd+1 if it
was an increment. Otherwise, it just emits an error.
The correction of errors striking Val , Colid and the com-
putation of y are corrected together. Let now d be the ratio
of the second component of dx to the first one. If d is near
enough to an integer, the algorithm computes the checksum
matrix C′ =WᵀA and considers the number zC˜ of non-zero
columns of the difference matrix C˜ =| C−C′ |. At this stage,
three cases are possible:
• If zC˜ = 0, then the error is in the computation of yd, and
can be corrected by simply recomputing this value.
• If zC˜ = 1, then the error concerns an element of Val .
Let us call f the index of the non-zero column of C˜.
The algorithm finds the element of Val corresponding to
the entry at row d and column f of A and corrects it by
using the column checksums much like as described for
Rowidx . Afterwards, yd is recomputed to fix the result.
• If zC˜ = 2, then the error concerns an element of Colid .
Let us call f1 and f2 the index of the two non-zero
columns and m1, m2 the first and last elements of Colid
corresponding to non-zeros in row d. It is clear that
there exists exactly one index m∗ between m1 and m2
such that either Colidm∗ = f1 or Colidm∗ = f2. To
correct the error it suffices to switch the current value
of Colidm∗ , i.e., putting Colidm∗ = f2 in the former
case and Colidm∗ = f1 in the latter. Again, yd has to be
recomputed.
• if zC˜ > 2, then errors can be detected but not corrected,
and an error is emitted.
To correct errors striking x, the algorithm computes d, that
is the ratio of the second component of dx′ to the first one,
and checks that the distance between d and the nearest integer
is smaller than ε. Provided that this condition is verified, the
algorithm computes the value of the error τ =
∑n
i=1 xi− cx1
and corrects xd = xd−τ . The result is updated by subtracting
from y the vector yτ = Axτ , where xτ ∈ Rn×n is such that
xτd = τ and x
τ
i = 0 otherwise.
Finally, note that double errors could be shadowed when
using Algorithm 2, but the probability of such an event is
negligible. Still, there exists an improved version which avoids
this issue by adding a third checksum [15, Section 3.2].
4. Performance model
In Section 4.1, we introduce the general performance model.
Then in Section 4.2 we instantiate it for the three methods that
we are considering, namely ONLINE-DETECTION, ABFT-
DETECTION and ABFT-CORRECTION.
4.1. General approach
We introduce an abstract performance model to compute
the best combination of checkpoints and verifications for
iterative methods. We execute T time-units of work followed
by a verification, which we call a chunk, and we repeat this
scheme s times, i.e., we compute s chunks, before taking
a checkpoint. We say that the s chunks constitute a frame.
The whole execution is then partitioned into frames. We
assume that checkpoint, recovery and verification are error-free
operations. Let Tcp, Trec and Tverif be the respective cost of
these operations. Finally, assume an Exponential distribution
of errors and let q be the probability of successful execution
for each chunk: q = e−λT , where λ is the fault rate.
The goal of this section is to compute the expected time
E (s, T ) needed to execute a frame composed of s chunks
of size T . We derive the best value of s as a function of
T and of the resilience parameters Tcp, Trec, Tverif , and q,
the success probability of a chunk. Each frame is preceded
by a checkpoint, except maybe the first one (for which we
recover by reading initial data again). Following [6], we derive
the following recursive equation to compute the expected
completion time of a single frame:
E (s, T ) = qs(s(T + Tverif )) + Tcp)+
(1− qs) (E (Tlost) + Trec + E (s, T )) . (4)
Indeed, the execution is successful if all chunks are successful,
which happens with probability qs, and in this case the
execution time simply is the sum of the execution times of each
chunk plus the final checkpoint. Otherwise, with probability
1−qs, we have an error, which we detect after some time Tlost,
and that forces us to recover and restart the frame anew, hence
in time E (s, T ). The difficult part is to compute E (Tlost).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ s, let fi be the following conditional
probability:
fi = P (error strikes at chunk i|there is an error in the frame) .
Given the success probability q of a chunk, we obtain that
fi =
qi−1(1− q)
1− qs .
Indeed, the first i − 1 chunks were successful (probability
qi−1), the i-th one had an error (probability 1 − q), and we
condition by the probability of an error within the frame,
namely 1 − qs. With probability fi, we detect the error at
the end of the ith chunk, and we have lost the time spent
executing the i first chunks We derive that
E (Tlost) =
s∑
i=1
fi (i(T + Tverif )) .
We have
∑s
i=1 fi =
(1−q)h(q)
1−qs where h(q) = 1 + 2q +
3q2+ · · ·+ sqs−1. If m(q) = q+ q2+ · · ·+ qs = 1−qs+11−q − 1,
we get by differentiation that m′(q) = h(q), hence h(q) =
−(s+1)qs
1−q +
1−qs+1
(1−q)2 and finally
E (Tlost) = (T + Tverif )
sqs+1 − (s+ 1)qs + 1
(1− qs)(1− q) .
Plugging the expression of E (Tlost) back into Equation (4),
we obtain
E (s, T ) = s(T+Tverif ))+Tcp+(q−s−1)Trec+T
sqs+1 − (s+ 1)qs + 1
qs(1− q) ,
which simplifies into
E (s, T ) = Tcp+(q−s−1)Trec+(T+Tverif ) 1− q
s
qs(1− q) . (5)
We have to determine the value of s that minimizes the
overhead of a frame:
s = argmin
s≥1
(
E (s, T )
sT
)
. (6)
The minimization is complicated and should be conducted
numerically (because T , the size of a chunk, is still unknown).
Note that a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the
optimal value of T and s is available in [3].
4.2. Instantiation to CG
For each of the three methods, ONLINE-DETECTION,
ABFT-DETECTION and ABFT-CORRECTION, we instantiate
the previous model and discuss how to solve Equation (6).
4.2.1. ONLINE-DETECTION. For Chen’s method [9], we
have the following parameters:
• We have chunks of d iterations, hence T = dTiter, where
Titer is the raw cost of a CG iteration without any resilience
method.
• The verification time Tverif is the cost of the operations
described in Section 3.1.
• As for silent errors, the application is protected from arith-
metic errors in the ALU, as in Chen’s original method, but also
for corruption in data memory (because we also checkpoint
the matrix A). Let λa be the rate of arithmetic errors, and
λm be the rate of memory errors. For the latter, we have
λm =Mλword if the data memory consists of M words, each
susceptible to be corrupted with rate λword. Altogether, since
the two error sources are independent, they have a cumulated
rate of λ = λa + λm, and the success probability for a chunk
is q = e−λT .
Plugging these values in Equation (6) gives an optimisation
formula very similar to that of Chen [9, Section 5.2]. The only
difference is that we have assumed that the verification is error-
free, which is needed for the correctness of the approach.
4.2.2. ABFT-DETECTION. When using ABFT techniques,
we detect possible errors every iteration, so a chunk is a single
iteration, and T = Titer. For ABFT-DETECTION, Tverif is the
overhead due to the checksums and redundant operations to
detect a single error in the method.
ABFT-DETECTION can protect the application from the
same silent errors as ONLINE-DETECTION, and just as before
the success probability for a chunk (a single iteration here) is
q = e−λT .
4.2.3. ABFT-CORRECTION. In addition to detection, we
now correct single errors at every iteration. Just as for ABFT-
DETECTION, a chunk is a single iteration, and T = Titer,
but Tverif corresponds to a larger overhead, mainly due to
the extra checksums needed to detect two errors and correct a
single one.
The main difference lies in the error rate. An iteration with
ABFT-CORRECTION is successful if zero or one error has
struck during that iteration, so that the success probability
is much higher than for ONLINE-DETECTION and ABFT-
DETECTION. We compute that value of the success probability
as follows. We have a Poisson process of rate λ, where
λ = λa + λm as for ONLINE-DETECTION and ABFT-
DETECTION. The probability of exactly k errors in time T
is (λT )
k
k! e
−λT [27], hence the probability of no error is e−λT
and the probability of exactly one error is λTe−λT , so that
q = e−λT + λTe−λT .
5. Experiments
5.1. Setup
There are two different sources of advantages in combining
ABFT and checkpointing. First, the error detection capability
lets us perform a cheap validation of the partial result of each
CG step, recovering as soon as an error strikes. Second, being
able to correct single errors makes each step more resilient and
increases the expected number of consecutive valid iterations.
We say an iteration is valid if it is non-faulty, or it suffers
from a single error that is corrected via ABFT.
For our experiments, we use a set of positive definite
matrices from the UFL Sparse Matrix Collection [11], with
size between 17456 and 74752 and density lower than 10−2.
At each step, faults are injected during vector and matrix-
vector operations but, since we are assuming selective reli-
ability, all of the checksums and checksum operations are
considered non-faulty. Faults are modeled as bit flips occurring
independently at each step, under an exponential distribution
of parameter λ, as detailed in Section 4.2. These bit flips
can strike either the matrix (the elements of Val ,Colid and
Rowidx ), or any entry of the CG vectors ri,q,pi or xi. We
choose not to inject errors striking the computation because
they are just a special case of the kind of issues we are consid-
ering. Moreover, to simplify the injection mechanism, Titer is
normalized to be one, meaning that each memory location or
operation is given the chance to fail just once per iteration [30].
Finally, to get data that are homogeneous among the test
matrices, the fault rate λ is chosen to be inversely proportional
to M (memory size) with a proportionality constant α ∈ (0, 1).
It follows that the expected number of CG steps between two
distinct fault occurrences does not depend either on the size
or on the sparsity ratio of the matrix.
We compare the performance of three algorithms, namely
ONLINE-DETECTION, ABFT-DETECTION (single detection
and rolling back as soon as an error is detected), and ABFT-
CORRECTION (correcting single errors during a given step
and rolling back only if two errors strike a single operation).
A detailed discussion of the implementation of this mixed
strategy can be found in the technical report [15, Section 4.2].
Implementing Algorithm 2, in particular the tests at line
23, poses a challenge. The comparison dr = cr − sr is
between two integers, and can be correctly evaluated by any
programming language using the equality check. However, the
other two, having floating point operands, are problematic.
Since the floating point operations are not associative and
the distributive property does not hold, we need a tolerance
parameter that takes into account the rounding operations that
are performed by each floating point operation. Here, we give
an upper bound on the difference between the two floating
point checksums, using the standard model [18, Section 2.2]
so that the errors caught by the tests at line 23 of Algorithm 2
are really errors and not merely inaccuracies due to floating
point operations (which is tolerable, as non-faulty executions
can give rise to the same inaccuracy).
Theorem 2 (Accuracy of the floating point weighted check-
sums). Let A ∈ Rn×n, x ∈ Rn, c ∈ Rn. If all of the sums
involved into the matrix operations are performed using some
flavor of recursive summation [18, Chapter 4], it holds that
| fl ((cᵀA)x)− fl (cᵀ (Ax)) |≤ 2 γ2n | cᵀ | | A | | x | . (7)
We refer the reader to the technical report for the proof [15,
Theorem 2]. Let us note that if all of the entries of c are
positive, as it is often the case in our setting, the absolute
value of c in (7) can be safely replaced with c itself. It is also
clear that these bounds are not computable, since cᵀ | A | | x |
is not, in general, a floating point number. This problem can
be alleviated by overestimating the bound by means of matrix
and vector norms.
Recalling that it can be shown [19, Section B.7] that
‖A‖1 = max
1≤j≤n
n∑
i=1
| ai,j | , (8)
we can upper bound the right hand side in (7) so that
| fl ((cᵀA)x)− fl (cᵀ (Ax)) |≤ 2 γ2n n ‖cᵀ‖∞ ‖A‖1 ‖x‖∞ . (9)
Though the right hand side of (9) is not exactly computable in
floating point arithmetic, it requires an amount of operations
dramatically smaller than the one in (7), just a few sums for
the norm of A. As this norm is usually computed using the
identity in (8), any kind of summation yields a relative error
of at most n′u [18, Section 4.6], where n′ is the maximum
number of nonzeros in a column of A, and u is the machine
epsilon. Since we are dealing with sparse matrices, we expect
n′ to be very small, and hence the computation of the norm
to be accurate. Moreover, the right hand side in (9) does not
depend on x, it can be computed just once for a given matrix
and weight vector.
Clearly, using (9) as tolerance parameter guarantees no false
positive (a computation without any error that is considered as
faulty), but allows false negatives (an iteration during which
an error occurs without being detected) when the perturbations
of the result are small. Nonetheless, this solution works almost
perfectly in practice, meaning that though the convergence rate
can be slowed down, the algorithms still converges towards the
“correct” answer. Though such an outcome could be surprising
at first, Elliott et al. [13], [33] showed that bit flips that strike
the less significant digits of the floating point representation of
vector elements during a dot product create small perturbations
of the results, and that the magnitude of this perturbation gets
smaller as the size of the vectors increases. Hence, we expect
errors that are not detected by our tolerance threshold to be
too small to impact the solution of the linear solver.
5.2. Simulations
To validate the model, we perform the simulation whose
results are illustrated in Table 1. For each matrix, we set
λ = 116M and consider the average execution time of 50
repetitions of both ABFT-DETECTION (columns 5-8) and
ABFT-CORRECTION (columns 6-9). In the table we record
the checkpointing interval s∗i , that achieves the shortest ex-
ecution time Et (s∗1), and the checkpointing interval s˜i that
is the best stepsize according to our method, along with its
execution time Et (s˜i). Finally, we evaluate the performance
of our guess by means of the quantity
li =
Et (s˜i)− Et (s∗i )
Et (s∗i )
· 100,
that expresses the loss, in terms of execution time, of executing
with the checkpointing interval given by our model with
respect to the best possible choice.
From the table, it is clear that the values of s˜i and s∗i are
close, even though the time lost is something considerably
high, reaching peaks above 15% for l1 and just below 40%
for l2. This seemingly poor result depends just on the small
number of repetitions we are considering, that leads to the
presence of outliers, lucky runs in which a small number of
errors occur and the computation is carried on in a much
quicker way. Similar results hold for smaller values of λ.
We also compare the execution time of the three algorithms
to empirically asses how much their relative performance
depend on the fault rate. The results on our test matrices
are shown in Fig. 1, where the y-axis is the execution time
(in seconds), and the x-axis is the normalized mean time
between failure (the reciprocal of α). Here, the larger x = 1α ,
the smaller the corresponding value of λ = αM , hence the
smaller the expected number of errors. For each value of λ,
we draw the average execution time of 50 runs of the three
algorithms, using the best checkpointing interval predicted in
Section 4.1 for ABFT-DETECTION and ABFT-CORRECTION,
and by Chen [9, Eq. 10] for ONLINE-DETECTION. In terms of
the execution time, Chen’s method is comparable to ours for
middle to high fault rates, since it clearly outperforms ABFT-
DETECTION in five out of nine cases, though being slightly
faster than ABFT-CORRECTION just for the last matrix. For
lower fault rates, however, ONLINE-DETECTION seems to
be the slowest one: this is plausibly due to the fact that
its detection/correction mechanism implies a greater overhead
compared to ABFT mechanisms. Moreover, the algorithm that
relies on both ABFT correction and checkpointing becomes
slightly slower than the detection/recovery mechanism for very
small values of λ.
Intuitively, this behavior is not surprising. When λ is large,
many errors occur but, since α is between zero and one, we
always have, in expectation, less than one error per iteration.
Thus ABFT-CORRECTION requires fewer checkpoints than
ABFT-DETECTION and almost no rollback, and this com-
pensates for the slightly longer execution time of a single
step. When the fault rate is very low, instead, the algorithms
perform almost the same number of iterations, but ABFT-
CORRECTION takes slightly longer due to the additional
dot products at each step.
Altogether, the results show that ABFT-CORRECTION out-
performs both ONLINE-DETECTION and ABFT-DETECTION
for a wide range of fault rates, thereby demonstrating that
combining checkpointing with ABFT correcting techniques
is more efficient than pure checkpointing for most practical
situations.
6. Conclusion
We consider the problem of silent errors in iterative linear
systems solvers. At first, we focus our attention on ABFT
methods for SpMxV, developing algorithms able to detect
and correct errors in both memory and computation using
various checksumming techniques. Then, we combine ABFT
with replication, in order to develop a resilient CG kernel that
can protect axpy’s and dot products as well. We also discuss
how to take numerical issues into account when dealing with
actual implementations. These methods are a worthy choice
for a selective reliability model, since most of the operations
id n density s˜1 Et (s˜1) s∗1 Et
(
s∗1
)
l1 s˜2 Et (s˜2) s∗2 Et
(
s∗2
)
l2
341 23052 2.15e-03 18 8.52 17 8.50 6.19 14 5.68 12 5.60 0.19
752 74752 1.07e-04 15 6.52 10 5.61 16.21 13 5.72 10 5.68 0.73
924 60000 2.11e-04 10 8.92 7 8.30 7.44 13 4.31 14 4.17 3.36
1288 30401 5.10e-04 15 6.81 12 6.31 7.98 16 6.95 13 6.68 4.02
1289 36441 4.26e-04 16 8.20 13 7.42 10.49 16 7.69 13 7.58 1.50
1311 48962 2.14e-04 16 8.75 13 7.70 13.66 16 7.52 16 7.52 0.00
1312 40000 1.24e-04 14 4.86 11 4.18 16.23 15 3.96 16 3.17 25.01
1848 65025 2.44e-04 17 9.56 15 9.40 2.09 16 12.78 14 9.31 37.22
2213 20000 1.39e-03 17 7.10 15 6.71 5.92 16 6.60 25 5.42 21.77
Table 1. Experimental validation of the model. Here s˜i and s∗i represent the best checkpointing interval according to
our model and to our simulations respectively, whereas Et (s˜i) and Et (s∗i ) stand for the execution time of the
algorithm using these checkpointing intervals.
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Figure 1. Execution time in seconds (y axis) of ONLINE-DETECTION (dotted), ABFT-DETECTION (dashed) and ABFT-
CORRECTION (solid line) with respect to the normalized MTBF (x-axis). The matrix number is in the subcaption.
can be performed in unreliable mode, whereas only checksum
computations need to be performed reliably.
In addition, we examine checkpointing techniques as a tool
to improve the resilience of our ABFT CG and develop a
model to trade-off the checkpointing interval so to achieve the
shortest execution time in expectation. We implement two of
the possible combinations, namely an algorithm that relies on
roll back as soon as an error is detected, and one that is able
to correct a single error and recovers from a checkpoint just
when two errors strike. We validate the model by means of
simulations and finally compare our algorithms with Chen’s
approach, empirically showing that ABFT overhead is usually
smaller than Chen’s verification cost.
We expect this combined approach to be useful even
when dealing with the preconditioned CG Algorithm [29], a
modified version of Algorithm 1 that requires, at each step,
an additional matrix-vector operation. In this case, diagonal,
approximate inverse, and triangular preconditioners seem to be
particularly attracting, since it should be possible to treat them
by adapting the techniques described in this paper (Shantaram
et al. [31] addressed the triangular case). However, not having
a practical and general decoding algorithm for multiple error
correction is a major obstacle. We are therefore convinced that
finding such an algorithm would widen the applicability of this
work.
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